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SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
DEVELOPMENTS IN NEW YORK LAW

Court of Appeals clarifies definition of "the same cause of action"
for purposes of claim preclusion
Claim preclusion, an aspect of res judicata,17 forecloses relitigation of matters which have been or which could have been litigated
in a prior adjudication when a subsequent suit is based on the same
cause of action. 21 What constitutes the same cause of action for
claim preclusion purposes, however, is not always clear. 219 Recently,
Procedure Law and other statues [do not sanction] a general remission of the Tax Law's call
for secrecy merely to accomodate a grand jury subpoena. . . where there is a total absence
of any showing . ..that the investigation bears some relationship to tax matters." Id.
(citation omitted).
m The term res judicata often is used broadly to include all instances in which a party
is precluded from relitigating matters involved in prior adjudications. D. SIEGEL, NEw YORK
PRACTICE § 442 (1978); accord, RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF JUDGMENTS, Introductory Note ch.
3 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973). Used in this manner, the concept encompasses both "claim
preclusion" and "issue preclusion." See SIEGEL, supra, §§ 442-443, 450.
Claim preclusion prevents relitigation of an entire cause of action if a final and binding
judgment previously has been rendered on the same matter. This doctrine is comprised of
two subcategories: merger and bar.'Under the merger rule, when judgment is rendered in
favor of the plaintiff, "his cause of action 'merges' in the judgment" and may not be relitigated. Conversely, if the defendant has judgment in an action, the plaintiff thereafter is
'barred' from relitigating the same cause of action. SIEGEL, supra, § 450; accord,RESTATEMENT
(SEcOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 45, 47-48, 61 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973). For a discussion of special
circumstances, such as "dismissal for lack of jurisdiction," when merger and bar will not
operate to preclude a subsequent suit on the same cause of action, see id. §§ 48.1, 61.2.
In contrast, issue preclusion operates to foreclose relitigation of specific questions of fact
or law that were actually or implicitly resolved in an earlier adjudication. Statter v. Statter,
2 N.Y.2d 668, 672-73, 143 N.E.2d 10, 12, 163 N.Y.S.2d 13, 16-17 (1957); Schuylkill Fuel Corp.
v. Nieberg Realty Corp., 250 N.Y. 304, 306-07, 165 N.E. 456, 457 (1929); SIEGEL, supra, §§
457, 460. This doctrine may not be raised, however, against a party who did not have a full
and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in a prior action. See Schwartz v. Public Adm'r, 24
N.Y.2d 65, 71, 246 N.E.2d 725, 729, 298 N.Y.S.2d 955, 960 (1969); RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF
JUDGMENTS § 68 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1977). Like claim preclusion, issue preclusion has two
aspects. One aspect, collateral estoppel, precludes relitigation in subsequent suits of issues
that previously were determined in a suit based on a different cause of action. SIEGEL, supra,
§ 457; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 68, Comment b (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1977); see
In re American Ins. Co., 43 N.Y.2d 184, 189 n.2, 371 N.E.2d 798, 801 n.2, 401 N.Y.S.2d 36,
39 n.2 (1977); Schuylkill Fuel Corp. v. Nieberg Realty Corp., 250 N.Y. 304, 306-07, 165 N.E.
456, 457 (1929). Direct estoppel, on the other hand, precludes relitigation of issues determined
in a proceeding which was dismissed on grounds other than the merits. SIEGEL, supra, § 443.
For an excellent discussion of the distinctions between issue preclusion and claim preclusion,
see Rosenberg, CollateralEstoppel in New York, 44 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 165 (1969).
I's
Rosenberg, supra note 267, at 166-67; SIEGEL, supra note 267, § 442, at 585, § 445 at
591-92; see Cromwell v. County of Sac., 94 U.S. 351, 352 (1876); Schuylkill Fuel Corp. v.
Nieberg Realty Corp., 250 N.Y. 304, 306-07, 165 N.E. 456, 457 (1929).
21 See Smith v. Kirkpatrick, 305 N.Y. 66, 70, 111 N.E.2d 209, 211 (1953); F. JAMES, CviL
PROCEDURE § 11.10 at 554 (1965); A. VESTAL, RES JUDICATA/PRECLUSION V-43 (1969); Rosenberg,
supra note 267, at 168. According to one commentator:

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:107

in Reilly v. Reid,2 the Court of Appeals held that, where the remedy sought and the facts necessary to support a claim are the same
as those determined in an earlier adjudication, the proceedings are
based on the same cause of action for res judicata purposes.,'
The Reilly petitioner was employed as an attorney in the competitive class of the civil service. 212 After his position was abolished,
the petitioner brought an article 78 proceeding, 273 contending that
under the Civil Service Law he was entitled to be appointed to the
same or a similar position in the noncompetitive or exempt civil
service class.24 This proceeding ultimately was dismissed on the
ground that the positions sought were not similar to the petitioner's
former position as a matter of law.27 5 Prior to this dismissal, however, the petitioner instituted a second proceeding in which he
sought reinstatement to his former job, arguing that the elimination
of the position was illegal. 5 The respondents unsuccessfully moved
for dismissal, contending that the proceeding was barred on res
The definitions of "cause of action" [for purposes of the res judicata doctrine] for
the most part fall into one of three main patterns: (1) Those which define it in terms
of the remedial right which is being enforced and limit it to a single right ....
(2) Those which define "cause of action" in terms of a single delict or breach of a
primary duty . .

.

. (3) Those which give the term "cause of action" a purely

factual content ....
JAMES, supra § 11.10, at 553 (footnotes omitted). See generally Cleary, Res Judicata
Reexamined, 57 YALE L.J. 339, 340 (1948); 65 HARv. L. REv. 820, 824-25 (1952).
70 45 N.Y.2d 24, 379 N.E.2d 172, 407 N.Y.S.2d 645 (1978), affg 58 App. Div. 2d 926, 397
N.Y.S.2d 429 (3d Dep't 1977) (mem.).
' 45 N.Y.2d at 30, 379 N.E.2d at 176, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 648-49.
272Id. at 26, 379 N.E.2d at 174, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 646. Petitioner Reilly had been employed
as an associate attorney with the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation. Id., 379 N.E.2d at 173, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 646.
The classified civil service is comprised of four classes: competitive, noncompetitive,
exempt, and labor. Appointments generally are made to competitive positions on the basis
of examinations. See Meenagh v. Dewey, 286 N.Y. 292, 304, 36 N.E.2d 211, 216 (1941);
Ottinger v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 240 N.Y. 435, 442-43, 148 N.E. 627, 629 (1925); N.Y. Civ.
SERV. LAw, Rules & Regs. §§ 2.1-2.2 (McKinney 1973).
v3 Article 78 of the CPLR defines the scope of judicial review of administrative agency
decisions and establishes the procedural mechanism for bringing a proceeding for review. For
a general discussion of article 78, see SIEGEL, supra note 267, §§ 557-570.
v' 45 N.Y.2d at 26-27, 379 N.E.2d at 173, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 646-47. After the elimination
of his position, the petitioner was offered a job at a lower grade level within the competitive
class. See N.Y. Civ. SERv. LAw § 80 (McKinney 1973). He rejected this offer, however, electing
instead to bring suit.
2" Reilly v. Reid, 55 App. Div. 2d 975, 390 N.Y.S.2d 655 (3d Dep't 1977).
278 45 N.Y.2d at 27, 379 N.E.2d at 174, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 647. In the second article 78
proceeding, the petitioner alleged that his former duties merely had been reassigned to the
non-competitive or exempt positions he sought in the previous proceeding. He contended that
this reassignment of duties was arbitrary and capricious, constituting an abuse of discretion.
Id. at 27, 379 N.E.2d at 174, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 647; see CPLR 7803(3) (1963).
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judicata grounds.2 7 The Appellate Division, Third Department, reversed and granted the respondents' motion to dismiss. g
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed, noting that in each
proceeding the petitioner had predicated his claim on the same
underlying factual transaction and had requested "nearly identical"
relief.2 79 Writing for the unanimous Court, Chief Judge Breitel rejected a strictly mechanical approach for determining when the
principles of claim preclusion should be invoked.20 The Court instead examined the factual foundation for the relief requested in
each proceeding and the extent to which the purportedly distinct
actions relied on similar proof.s82 Applying the criteria articulated
in the Second Restatement of Judgments, 212 Chief Judge Breitel
found the factual predicate in each proceeding to be the allegedly
wrongful abolition of the petitioner's civil service position.', While
material differences in the elements of proof might render distinct
two actions which arose from the same course of dealings between
the adversaries,284 the Reilly petitioner could not benefit from such
a rule, since in both proceedings he would have to "establish that
abolition of his position without transferring him to an equivalent
2m58 App. Div. 2d at 926, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 429; see CPLR 3211(a) (5) (1970). The appellate division held that the second proceeding was barred on "res judicata and collateral
estoppel" grounds since the issues involved in the second suit were "substantially the same
as those previously before the court." 58 App. Div. 2d at 927, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 430.
21758 App. Div. 2d at 927, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 430.
' 45 N.Y.2d at 26, 379 N.E.2d at 174, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 646.
Id. at 29, 379 N.E.2d at 175-76, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 648. The Court stated that "no single
definition formulation is always determinative" in assessing what constitutes the same cause
of action. Id. at 29, 379 N.E.2d at 176, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 648. The Court suggested, however,
that the categorical approach exemplified by the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §
61(2) (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973) may be useful in evaluating similarity between causes of
action. 45 N.Y.2d at 29, 379 N.E.2d at 176, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 648.
21 45 N.Y.2d at 29-31, 379 N.E.2d at 175-77, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 648-49.
s Id. at 29-30, 379 N.E.2d at 176-77, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 648-49. The section of the Restatement quoted by the Reilly Court emphasizes a transactional approach and provides that the
claim or cause of action extinguished by a prior judgment "includes all rights of the plaintiff
to remedies against the defendant with respect to all or any part of the transaction, or series

of connected transactions, out of which the action arose."

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF

§ 61(1) (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973). According to the Restatement, "whether the
facts are related in time, space, origin, or motivation, [and] whether they form a convenient
trial unit" are particularly significant factors in "pragmatically" assessing the elements of a
litigated transaction. Id. § 61(2) & Comment b. It should be noted that the section of the
1973 Restatement draft which defines "cause of action" for res judicata purposes was submitted in substantially the same form in 1978. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS
Foreword (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1978).
2 45 N.Y.2d at 30, 379 N.E.2d at 176-77, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 648.
2" Id., 379 N.E.2d at 176, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 649; accord, Smith v. Kirkpatrick, 305 N.Y.
66, 72, 111 N.E.2d 209, 212 (1953).
JUDGMENTS
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position was in violation of law. '285 In addition, the Court noted, in
both suits the petitioner sought essentially the same relief-"restoration to his original tuties"-although he did so by
requesting a nominally different remedy under a different legal
theory. 5 Thus, the Reilly Court found that the petitioner's two
2' 45 N.Y.2d at 30, 379 N.E.2d at 176, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 649. The Court determined that
the proof in the petitioner's second proceeding would rest upon substantially the same
"foundation facts" as those presented in the earlier suit. In the first proceeding, in order to
establish his right to a noncompetitive or exempt position, the petitioner would have had to
prove that the duties involved in the position sought were substantially the same as those of
his former position. See N.Y. Civ. SERv. LAW § 80 (McKinney 1973). In the second suit, in
order to show that his former position had been wrongfully abolished, the petitioner also
would have to demonstrate the similarity between the duties of his former job and those of
the position to which his duties allegedly were reassigned. See Meenagh v. Dewey, 286 N.Y.
292, 298, 36 N.E.2d 211, 217 (1941). The Court contrasted the Reilly petitioner's situation to
that of the plaintiff in Smith v. Kirkpatrick, 305 N.Y. 66, 111 N.E.2d 209 (1953), where the
Court held that an action in quantum meruit was not foreclosed by the adjudication of a prior
action arising from the same transaction. Id. at 72, 111 N.E.2d at 212. In the earlier suit, the
plaintiff's claim for breach of contract was dismissed on Statute of Frauds grounds, and his
joint venture theory was dismissed on the merits. Id. at 68-69, 111 N.E.2d at 210-11. Although
in the quantum meruit action the plaintiff sought payment for the same work that was the
subject of the prior suit, the proof in each action varied. In the earlier suit, the plaintiff
concentrated on proving the existence of a valid agreement giving rise to a right to payment.
Id. at 71, 111 N.E.2d at 212. In the later suit, however, the plaintiff emphasized the value of
the services he had rendered without regard to any agreement. Id. Commenting upon the
plaintiff's right to maintain the action, the Smith court stated:
The two actions [joint venture and quantum meruit] involve different "rights"
and "wrongs". The requisite elements of proof and hence the evidence necessary
to sustain recovery vary materially. The causes of action are different and distinct
and the rights and interests established by, the previous adjudication will not be
impaired by a recovery, if that be the outcome, in quantum meruit.
Id. at 72, 111 N.E.2d at 212. Thus, under the Smith Court's approach, claim preclusion
principles will be invoked only when successive suits are predicated on the same transaction
or series of transactions and the successive claims are dependent upon the same evidence.
See Marsh v. Masterson, 101 N.Y. 401, 407, 5 N.E. 59, 61 (1886); Lipkind v. Ward, 256 App.
Div. 74, 78, 8 N.Y.S.2d 832, 836-37, (3d Dep't 1939). See also Perry v. Dickerson, 85 N.Y.
345, 350 (1881). In Perry, the Court held that a suit to recover wages for services rendered
was a different cause of action from a suit for damages for breach of an employment agreement since "[t]he wages could not have been proved or recovered under the pleadings in
[the damage suit] nor the damages for the wrongful dismissal in [the suit for wages]." Id.
at 350.
1 45 N.Y.2d at 30, 379 N.E.2d at 176, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 648-49_ T1he Court stated that,
where there is an identity in the factual predicates and proof involved in successive proceedings, variation of legal theory or remedy sought in the subsequent suit will not give rise to a
distinct cause of action. Id. at 30, 379 N.E.2d at 176, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 649; accord,
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 61.1 & Comment d, at 98 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973);
see Gowan v. Tully, 45 N.Y.2d 32, 36, 379 N.E.2d 177, 179, 407 N.Y.S.2d 650, 652 (1978);
City of Rye v. Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 24 N.Y.2d 627, 637, 249 N.E.2d 429, 433-34, 301
N.Y.S.2d 569, 575 (1969); Hahl v. Sugo, 169 N.Y. 109, 114-15, 62 N.E.2d 135, 137 (1901);
Eidelberg v. Zellermayer, 5 App. Div. 2d 658, 663, 174 N.Y.S.2d 300, 304 (1st Dep't 1958),
aff'd mem., 6 N.Y.2d 815, 159 N.E.2d 691, 188 N.Y.S.2d 204 (1959).

1978]

SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE

causes of action were not sufficiently distinguishable for claim preclusion purposes.28
The Reilly holding is in accord with earlier New York cases
which utilized tests emphasizing the nature of the wrongful act or
the evidence to be presented as criteria for determining whether
successive suits involved identical causes of action for res judicata
purposes. 28 Significantly, however, while reaffirming the viability of
2 45 N.Y.2d at 30, 379 N.E.2d at 177, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 649. The Reilly Court noted in
dictum that, under the holding of Statter v. Statter, 2 N.Y.2d 668, 143 N.E.2d 10, 163
N.Y.S.2d 13 (1957), the petitioner would be precluded from further litigating the validity of
the elimination of his position, since the first proceeding, in which he sought transfer to a
different civil service position, may have "necessarily assumed the validity of the abolition
of the old position." 45 N.Y.2d at 31, 379 N.E.2d at 177, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 649-50. The Statter
Court held that the existence of a former judgment precludes relitigation of issues that were
actually or implicitly litigated in the action even when the second suit is premised on a
different cause of action. 2 N.Y.2d at 672-73, 143 N.E.2d at 12, 163 N.Y.S.2d at 16-17. Thus,
"[w]here a judgment of a particular kind can only be accounted for legally by the existence
of a certain combination of findings, each of those findings will be deemed established by the
judgment." SIEGEL, supra note 267, § 464, at 614. In Statter, for example, where a separation
decree was granted, the parties were thereafter precluded from showing that a valid marriage
never existed between them. Permitting the wife to maintain a subsequent annulment action
was held impermissible because it would have undermined the original separation decree,
which was predicated on the existence of a valid marriage between the parties. 2 N.Y.2d at
673, 143 N.E.2d at 13, 163 N.Y.S.2d at 17. In reaching this conclusion, the Statter Court
invoked the "impairment" test articulated in Schuylkill Fuel Corp. v. Nieberg Realty Corp.,
250 N.Y. 304, 165 N.E. 456 (1929). See note 288 infra. The StatterCourt's use of the Schuylkill
"impairment" doctrine has been criticized. According to one commentator:
It is curious that the wife's cause of action, based on the premise that the marriage
was a nullity, could be found the same as a cause of action premising its validity
....
The explanation for the Court's odd conclusion lies in the tangled reasoning
the Schuylkill doctrine encourages . ...
The "impairment" test [of Schuylkill] may be logical but it is far from reliable. The mere circumstances that failure to give conclusive effect to a matter
involved in an earlier suit will permit a grossly inconsistent result in a second suit
does not compel the second court to apply res judicata [as the Smith case demonstrates] ....
Better analysis in the Statter case would have recognized that since the wife's
claim for annulment was different from her husband's earlier case for separation,
she should not have been precluded on the issue of the validity of the marriage
because that issue had gone uncontested in the husband's action.
Rosenberg, supra note 1, at 170-71 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original); see note 285
supra.
211New York courts have utilized various tests to determine whether the causes of action
in successive suits are the same. One test is whether rights established in an earlier suit will
be impaired by a different holding in a subsequent suit. Schuylkill Fuel Corp. v. Nieberg
Realty Corp., 250 N.Y. 304, 307, 165 N.E. 456, 457 (1929). Under the Schuylkill test, the result
reached in Reilly would likely have been the same, since the determination in the first suit,
that the state was not obliged to employ Reilly in a comparable civil service position, would
have been impaired by a holding in the second suit which permitted Reilly to return to his

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:107

a variety of traditional tests,"' the Court appears to be moving
toward the transactional approach recommended by the Restateformer position. One commentator, however, has criticized the Schuylkill rule, noting that
its test is circular because "whether 'rights or interests' . . . established by the former judgment would be 'destroyed or impaired' . . . depends in many cases on what the court now
decides is the effect of the earlier judgment so far as creating rights or interests." Rosenberg,
supra note 267, at 169. It is interesting to note that the Schuykill doctrine was not applied to
bar the quantum meruit claim in Smith v. Kirkpatrick, 305 N.Y. 66, 111 N.E.2d 209 (1953),
see note 285 supra, although a holding that the defendant owed the plaintiff money would
have undermined the earlier finding that no money was owed. According to Professor Rosenberg, this retreat from the Schuylkill rationale was the result of the Smith Court's finding
that the evidence material to each cause of action in Smith differed. Rosenberg, supra note
267, at 168.
Another approach used by the courts rests upon an examination of the nature of the
wrongful act at issue. See, e.g., De Coss v. Turner & Blanchard, Inc., 267 N.Y. 207, 196 N.E.
28 (1935); Secor v. Sturgis, 16 N.Y. 548 (1858); Stoner v. Culligan, Inc., 32 App. Div. 2d 170,
300 N.Y.S.2d 966 (3d Dep't 1969). The Secor Court reasoned: "The true distinction between
demands or rights of action which are single and entire, and those which are several and
distinct is, that the former immediately arise out of one and the same act. . . and the latter
out of different acts . . . ." 16 N.Y. at 558. The "wrongful act" test is unsatisfactory, however, because it is difficult to predict which conduct the courts will determine to be the
wrongful act underlying the respective causes of action. In Reilly, for example, the Court
found a single wrongful act: the abolition of petitioner's position. See note 283 and accompanying text supra.It could be argued, however, that there was some basis for the Court to find
that the petitioner's two suits arose from different acts. The initial claim in Reilly was based
on the respondents' allegedly wrongful refusal to appoint the petitioner to a noncompetitive
position after the elimination of his competitive position. The second action, on the other
hand, might have been based on the wrongful abolition of the competitive position. Similarly,
in Smith, where the Court found two different acts, see note 285 supra, it can be argued that
the suits arose from the same act: failure to compensate the plaintiff for work performed.
Thus, although the Court in Reilly reaffirmed the viability of a "wrongful act" test, it is
submitted that the standard may be unreliable.
The test that appears to have been most influential in the Reilly decision, however, is
whether the proof and evidence involved in the subsequent suit would be substantially the
same as that involved in the prior suit. See, e.g., Smith v. Kirkpatrick, 305 N.Y. 66, 72, 111
N.E.2d 209, 212 (1953); Lipkind v. Ward, 256 App. Div. 74, 78, 8 N.Y.S.2d 832, 836-37 (3d
Dep't 1939); note 285 supra. The rationale in Eidelberg v. Zellermayer, 5 App. Div. 2d 658,
662, 174 N.Y.S.2d 300, 304 (1st Dep't 1958), aff'd mem., 6 N.Y.2d 815, 159 N.E.2d 691, 188
N.Y.S.2d 204 (1959), represents a typical application of this test. In Eidelberg, a second
action in joint venture was precluded by a former adjudication of the same "inceptive facts"
premised on a sale agreement theory. 5 App. Div. 2d at 661, 174 N.Y.S.2d at 302. The
Eidelberg court looked beyond the facts pertinent to the specific legal theory pleaded and
analyzed the "foundation facts" in each suit. Finding them identical, the court determined
that the successive suits were based on the same cause of action. Similar reasoning is apparent in the Reilly opinion, where the Court stressed the identity of the underlying transaction.
See generally Rosenberg, supra note 267, at 168.
2 See 45 N.Y.2d at 27-28, 31, 379 N.E.2d at 174-76, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 647, 649, where
the Reilly Court reaffirmed the Secor and Smith rationales. See notes 17 & 23 supra. In
addition, in Reilly and a companion case, Gowan v. Tully, 45 N.Y.2d 32, 36, 379 N.E.2d 177,
179, 407 N.Y.S.2d 650, 652 (1978), the Court expressly reaffirmed the validity of the
Schuylkill doctrine. 45 N.Y.2d at 29, 379 N.E.2d at 175, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 648; see note 288
supra.
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ment. 1 Borrowing from this approach, the Court in Reilly looked
past the superficial differences in the petitioner's separately litigated claims and emphasized instead the common factual foundation necessary to support the two causes of action.29 ' Although the
Reilly opinion does not establish a clear standard, 292 it does reflect
the Court's view that the concept of a "cause of action" should be
realistically defined for purposes of applying the principles of res
judicata. 213 Since modem procedural rules are designed to maximize
a litigant's opportunity to procure relief to which he is entitled in a
single adjudication,2 4 a requirement that suitors present all claims
premised on the same factual foundation in a single action is not
unduly harsh. Moreover, in addition to promoting judicial economy,
such a rule seems calculated2 to further the interest of all litigants
in the finality of judgments.

1

Marea C. Mul
2" See note 282 supra. The reasoning applied in Gowan v. Tully, 45 N.Y.2d 32, 379
N.E.2d 177, 407 N.Y.S.2d 650 (1978), also is illustrative of the apparent inclination of the
Court of Appeals to emphasize the nature of the underlying gravamen and foundation facts
in considering the scope of a cause of action. Accord, Expert Elec., Inc. v. Levine, 554 F.2d
1227, 1234 (2d Cir. 1977); V.C. Vitanza Sons, Inc. v. Ross, 63 App. Div. 2d 1068,406 N.Y.S.2d
160, 162 (3d Dep't 1978).
2
See note 281 and accompanying text supra.
2 According to one commentator, lack of precision is unavoidable.
Detailed rules cannot settle [when causes of action are the same], for the factors
that influence decision defy prescription. They include such complex considerations
as the practical needs of administering justice conveniently and efficiently and the
degree of favor or disfavor with which the law regards the type of claim made by
the plaintiff.
Rosenberg, supra note 267, at 169 (footnote omitted).
Another commentator has suggested:
Perhaps the time has come to. . . ask simply whether the party to be precluded
had adequate opportunity to litigate the matter in the earlier proceeding and
whether the matter is closely enough related to the original controversy so that
judicial economy would be served by confining litigation to one proceeding. If these
two conditions are satisfied, .... preclusion will generally be neither unforeseeable
nor unfair.
Currie, Res Judicata:The Neglected Defense, 45 U. Cm. L. Rav. 317, 342 (1978) (footnotes
omitted).
3 See 45 N.Y.2d at 29, 379 N.E.2d at 175-76, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 648. In the future, because
of the Court's focus on the factual foundation underlying a cause of action, the practitioner
would be wise to plead all possible theories related to an underlying factual predicate in one
action.
2I See, e.g., CPLR 104 (1970) (purpose of CPLR is to procure just and speedy determination of lawsuits); CPLR 1002 (1976) (permitting joinder of parties); CPLR 1007 (1976) (allowing impleader); CPLR 3014 (1974) (permitting hypothetical, inconsistent, and alternative
pleading); D. SIrEGL, supra note 267, § 207. See also Williamson v. Columbia Gas & Elec.
Corp., 186 F.2d 464, 469-70 (3d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 921 (1951).
" The concept of res judicata is premised on th6 principle that there must be finality
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Federal venue restrictionsfor suits against national banks held inapplicable to third-party claims
Under federal law, a national bank may be sued in a state court
in the county or city in which it is located.29 Although the language
of the applicable venue statute appears to be permissive, in
Mercantile National Bank v. Langdeau, 97 the United States Supreme Court held that "national banks may be sued only in those
' Recently,
state courts in the county where the banks are located."298
however, in Lazarow, Rettig & Sundel v. Castle Capital
in the litigation of disputes. New York State Labor Relations Bd. v. Holland Laundry, Inc.,
294 N.Y. 480, 493-94, 63 N.E.2d 68, 74 (1945); see Weiner v. Greyhound Bus Lines, Inc., 55
App. Div. 2d 189, 191, 389 N.Y.S.2d 884, 886 (2d Dep't 1976). Such finality is considered
essential for securing the rights and obligations of the parties and in preventing harrassing
and vexatious relitigation of.controversies. VESTAL, supra note 269, at V-7 to 10; see von
Moschzisker, Res Judicata, 38 YALE L.J. 299, 299-300 (1929); 65 HARV. L. REv. 818, 820 (1952).
Furthermore, finality of adjudications promotes consideration of judicial economy and the
integrity of determinations made by courts of competent jurisdiction. VESTAL, supra note 269,
at V-10 to 12; see D. SIEGEL, supra note 267, § 442; von Moschzisker, supra at 300-01. Due to
these considerations, "recent years have seen a marked expansion by the courts of the doctrine of res judicata." H. WAcHTELL, NEW YORK PRACTICE UNDER THE CPLR 451 (5th ed. 1976).
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The venue provision of the National Bank Act provides in pertinent part that
"[sluits. . .against any. . .[national bank] . . .may be had in any ... State. . .court
in the county or city in which said [national bank] is located." 12 U.S.C. § 94 (1976). Until
recently, the meaning of the term "located" as used in § 94 had been uncertain. New York
courts held that, for purposes of § 94, a bank is "located" and therefore could be sued, only
in that county in which its principal office is situated. E.g., Thomas v. Atlanta Nat'l Bank,
58 App. Div. 2d 1001, 396 N.Y.S.2d 946 (4th Dep't 1977) (mem.); Gregor J. Schaefer Sons,
Inc. v. Watson, 26 App. Div. 2d 659, 272 N.Y.S.2d 790 (2d Dep't 1966); Stephen-Leedom
Carpet Co. v. Republic Nat'l Bank of Dallas, 25 App. Div. 2d 645, 268 N.Y.S.2d 377 (1st Dep't
1966) (meri.). Courts in other jurisdictions, however, held that a national bank is "located"
in any county in which it operates a branch office. E.g., Security Mills of Asheville, Inc. v.
Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., N.A., 281 N.C. 525, 189 S.E.2d 266 (1972); Holson v. Gosnell,
264 S.C. 619, 216 S.E.2d 539 (1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1048 (1976). The issue was resolved
in Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank v. Bougas, 434 U.S. 35, 45 (1977), wherein the United States
Supreme Court adopted the latter position. For a critical discussion of the Citizens decision,
see Steinberg, Citizens & Southern National Bank v. Bougas-Achieving Justice Under the
Venue Provisions of the National Bank Act, 12 GA. L. Rav. 161, 170-73 (1978).
371 U.S. 555 (1963).
2U8 Id. at 561 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court has recognized only two exceptions
to the general rule precluding suits against national banks in forums other than those in
counties in which the bank is "located." In Casey v. Adams, 102 U.S. 66, 67 (1880), the Court
held that purely "local" actions may be brought in counties other than those specified in §
94. In addition, the Court has stated that the venue privilege may be waived by a failure to
assert it, Charlotte Nat'l Bank v. Morgan, 132 U.S. 141, 145 (1889), or by conduct which could
be construed as consent to be sued, National Bank of N. America v. Associates of Obstetrics
and Female Surgery, Inc., 425 U.S. 460 (1976) (per curiam). Conduct sufficient to constitute
consent appears to be limited to on-going business activity within the jurisdiction, including
qualifying to do business or appointing an agent to receive service of process in a foreign
district. Id. at 462 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).

